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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
justifying expulsion for their violation. Pratt v. Wheaton (1866), 40 Ill.
186; Tanton v. McKenney (1924), 226 Mich. 245, 197 N. W. 510.
C. S., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-TRANSFER TAX-INCLUSION OF IN-
SURANCE IN GROSS ESTATE.-The executor of the estate of a decedent sued
in the Court of Claims for a refund of taxes paid on the proceeds of insur-
ance policies in which the insured reserved the right to change the bene-
ficiaries. By the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227), these were included
in the gross estate of the decedent. The petition attacked the validity of
such tax, claiming first, that the tax was direct, and hence void because not
apportioned; and second, that such inclusion in the gross estate effected an
increase of tax upon the beneficiaries and those who shared in the remain-
ing estate so as to constitute a deprivation of property without due process
of law. On certificate to the United States Supreme Court, held, first, that
this is a tax on the transfer of the property and, therefore, not subject to
the constitutional provision requiring apportionment of direct taxes; and,
second, that such inclusion does not constitute a violation of the due process
clause. Chase National Bank v. United States (1928), 49 S. Ct. 126, 73 L.
Ed. (adv.) 114.
A life insurance policy reserving to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary does not vest an interest in the named beneficiary, because the
insured maintains as complete control of the policy as if he himself were the
beneficiary. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Swett (1915), 222 F. 200,
137 C. C. A. 640, Ann. Cas. 1917B 298; Re Joseph Greenberg (1921), 271 F.
258, 20 A. L. 1 . 253. See also Cooley's BRIEFS ON INSURANCE, Vol. VII, p.
6406. Some few cases hold that such a beneficiary's interest is vested, sub-
ject to being divested. Roquemore v. Dent (1902), 135 Ala. 292 So., 33 So.
178 and Ellison v. Straw (1903), 116 Wis. 207 N. W. 92 N. W. 1094 under
the Wisconsin statute. But the better and the majority rule does not treat
such an interest as analogous to the real property rule of vested rights;
rather the interest is treated as contingent. Fuller v. Linzee (1883), 135
Mass. 468.
It is true that so much of the Revenue Act of 1919 (40 Stat. 1057), as re-
quires all conveyances of property taking effect in possession and enjoy-
ment only after the transferor's death to be included in the gross estate of
the decedent transferor for purposes of taxation, violates the constitutional
provision against taking property without due process of law. Nichols v.
Coolidge (1926), 274 U. S. 531, 52 A. L. R. 1181; Untermeyer v. Anderson
(1927), 276 U. S. 440. But where a trust had been created before the pas-
sage of the statute, reserving to the settlor the power to dispose of the re-
mainder, a tax might be levied under the act on the power or succession,
because the death of the settlor freed the remainder, or terminated the
power, and this prerequisite to complete succession did not occur until after
the enactment of the statute. So long as the privilege of succession has not
been completely exercised, it may be taxed. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall (1927),
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276 U. S. 260; Nichols v. Cole (1920), 256 U. S. 222. A power of appoint-
ment reserved by the donor leaves the succession incomplete, and the estate
may be taxed; the same rule applies if the power of appointment is reserved
to another. Bullen v. Wisconsin (1915), 240 U. S. 925. As it is the trans-
fer by termination upon death of the power of disposition that is being
taxed, there can be no objection to the inclusion of the proceeds of insurance
policies together with the other interests transferred by the death of the
decedent. Stebbins v. Riley (1924), 268 U. S. 137, 44 A. L. R. 1454.
The laws governing the taxation of successions are applicable equally to
transfers, when the transferor reserves to himself a general power of ap-
pointment. When such power is not exercised, the property passes at the
death of the settlor or donor, and such transfer is taxable when it takes
place; consequently a law effective prior to the death of the donor, but sub-
sequent to the creation of the deed or policy is not retroactive as to the res
or transfer being taxed. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra; Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co. (1928), 49 S. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. (adv.) 117.
G. N. B., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ExERcIsE OF POLICE POWER IN GENERAL STERILIZA-
TION STATUTE.-In an action of mandamus to compel the surgeon of the
state hospital for the insane to perform the operation of vasectomy on one
of the inmates after a notice and hearing before the board of supervision
the defendant, on a motion to quash, put in issue the constitutionality of the
sterilization statute. R. S. Kans. 1923, 76-149 to 76-155; Const. U. S.
Amend. 14. Held, a law relating to sterilization of inmates of certain state
institutions is not unconstitutional as exceeding police power, nor as a
denial of equal protection, nor as a denial of due process. State ex rel.
Smith v. Schaffer (1928), 126 Kans. 607, 270 P. 604.
There has always been, since the beginning of time, a guarantee of "due
process" of law based, if not upon a written constitution, then upon the
rules of natural justice. Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113. But
whether or not sterilization of the insane constituted "due process" at com-
mon law is unknown. There seems to have been no cases raising such an
issue.
The modern trend is in favor of upholding the constitutionality of a
sterilization statute such as the one in the principal case, in accord with the
holding of that case. Buck v. Bell (1927), 274 U. S. 200 is final authority
upon the issue under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution
in all controversies falling within this class of cases. Smith v. Command
(1925), 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 40 A. L. R. 515 is in accord with the
principal case but concerns a statute authorizing the sterilization of all
defective persons. The reasons for sustaining a view such as this are ob-
vious when the medical theory that certain kinds of insanity are hereditary
is conclusively accepted, or is at least accepted to such an extent as to give
rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of the legislature as to its sound-
ness. Said Mr. Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, supra: "We have seen more
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